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Are International Judges Afraid of Science?:  
A Comment on Mbengue 
JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ* 
International lawyers have built international courts on two myths. 
The first is the proposition that international judges only find the law, 
not generate it.1 The second is that international judges make conclusive 
factual determinations of what actually occurred; that is, they find “the 
truth.”2 Ingo Venzke punctures the first myth by postulating that 
adjudicators are neither mechanistic appliers of pre-established sources 
of law nor wholly unbound interpreters issuing legal determinations 
based on pure volition.3 Venzke argues that international judges make 
law against the stabilizing, shared assumptions of an interpretative 
community and that judicial lawmaking is a species of communicative 
practice.4 
Makane Mbengue addresses one aspect of the second myth. He 
argues that international judges avoid getting embroiled with respect to 
at least one type of fact-finding, namely, scientific fact-finding (SFF), 
precisely because doing so does not fit their conception of finding “the 
truth.”5 His argument, based on cases such as the International Court of 
Justice’s (ICJ) decision in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Case,6 is that all 
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 1. See Ingo Venzke, The Role of International Courts as Interpreters and Developers of the 
Law:  Working Out the Jurisgenerative Practice of Interpretation, 34 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. 
L. REV. 99, 100–03 (2011) (presenting the argument that international courts apply the law, as 
opposed to creating it). 
 2. Makane Moïse Mbengue, International Courts and Tribunals as Fact-Finders:  The 
Case of Scientific Fact-Finding in International Adjudication, 34 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. 
REV. 53, 61 (2011). 
 3. See Venzke, supra note 1, at 100–02, 115–22 (explaining the role of international judges 
as interpreters and developers of the law and the consequences of judicial law-making). 
 4. Id. at 112–13. 
 5. Mbengue, supra note 2, at 58–59. 
 6. Id. at 64–65. 
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too often international judges avoid SFF or avoid weighing scientific 
evidence, even when the cases before them demand it. Judges do this 
because SFF (1) is too alien to the normal process of judicial fact-
finding; (2) involves highly complex, fact-intensive inquiries; (3) 
requires particular technological or other expertise not present on the 
bench; and, most importantly, (4) is characterized by uncertainty.7  
Mbengue stresses this last factor above all. He argues that SFF is 
“irresolutely oriented towards the unknown,”8 relies on probabilities 
(not verifiable certainties), and is characterized by volatility, circularity, 
paucity, impalpability, and the use of conjectural and refutable 
evidence.9 To Mbengue, SFF is at odds with what judges are more 
accustomed to doing, namely finding verifiable and ascertainable 
facts.10 Judges, Mbengue suggests, are used to validating verities not 
evaluating probabilities.11 Their uneasiness with SFF turns them into 
mere passive recipients of SFF instead of active questioners or shapers 
of it.12 
Mbengue goes beyond describing the problem; he proposes 
solutions. He praises the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID) tribunal in the Methanex Case for 
seriously engaging in the scientific facts at the heart of that dispute.13 He 
recommends that international judges embrace the uncertainties 
associated with SFF, overcome their discomfort with it, and avoid 
seeking to impose a single inappropriate yardstick for scientific facts.14 
He also disparages the argument made by Japan in the World Trade 
Organization’s (WTO) Southern Bluefin Tuna Case, namely the 
conviction that questions of scientific fact are not justiciable.15 Mbengue 
expresses confidence that international judges can and should evaluate 
evidence of every kind, including scientific evidence.16 They should not, 
in his view, passively rely on scientific evidence that litigants present, 
but should proactively deploy their inherent fact-finding powers by 
 
 7. See id. at 63–64. 
 8. Id. at 59. 
 9. Id. at 60–62. 
 10. Id. at 72–73. 
 11. Mbengue, supra note 2, at 58–59. 
 12. Id. at 76–78. 
 13. Id. at 71 (citing Methanex Corp. v. United States, Final Award of the Tribunal on 
Jurisdiction and Merits, ¶ 102 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib.), 
http://naftaclaims.com/Disputes/USA/Methanex/Methanex_Final_Award.pdf). 
 14. Id. at 76–78. 
 15. Id. at 67–68 (quoting Southern Bluefin Tuna (N.Z. v. Japan, Austl. v. Japan), 23 
R.I.A.A. 1 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2000)). 
 16. Id. at 79. 
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appointing experts as needed.17 They should not, in short, be afraid of 
reopening the appreciation of scientific evidence. 
Mbengue is not the only critic of fact-finding by international 
courts and tribunals. Others, including this author, have criticized, for 
example, the ICJ for “out-sourcing,” at least in part, its fact-finding to 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
(as in its Genocide Judgment of 2007),18 to the Porter Commission (in 
DRC v. Congo),19 and to the International Finance Corporation (in Pulp 
Mills).20 Nancy Combs has written a devastating book-length critique of 
fact-finding by international criminal courts, aptly entitled Fact-Finding 
Without Facts.21 Mbengue’s assertion that international judges are afraid 
of science needs to be seen within the context of these broader critiques.  
There are many reasons why international adjudicators encounter 
difficulties in fact-finding. As the late Thomas Franck noted years ago, 
the ICJ is hamstrung in this respect by the fact that it is a tribunal of first 
and last resort, and because it operates under somewhat rigid procedures 
and old-fashioned traditions, which are not well-suited to the active 
probing that Mbengue recommends.22 As is well known, ICJ 
proceedings rarely deviate from the written pleadings of the litigants. 
They do not involve the extensive presentation and cross-examination 
of witnesses (expert or otherwise) that one sees in, for example, ICSID 
tribunals; they generally do not involve the appointment of special 
masters, assessors, or experts by the court itself; they do not encourage 
the participation of amicus or active participation in hearings; and they 
do not conduct on-site hearings.23 These characteristics are built into the 
ICJ’s DNA and are difficult to change. 
International courts and tribunals are factually challenged in other 
ways as well. Unlike domestic trial courts, which are free to make fact-
determination their principal concern, the ICJ, or, for that matter, ICSID 
tribunals and international criminal courts, are all burdened by distance 
 
 17. Mbengue, supra note 2, at 76–78. 
 18. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), 2007 I.C.J. 43 (Feb. 26); see, e.g., José E. 
Alvarez, Burdens of Proof, AM. SOC’Y INT’L. L., Spring 2007 
http://www.asil.org/newsletter/president/pres070625.html. 
 19. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 
I.C.J. 168, 179 (Dec. 19). 
 20. Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, ¶ 166 (Apr. 20, 2010), 
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/135/15877.pdf. 
 21. See NANCY ARMOURY COMBS, FACT-FINDING WITHOUT FACTS 4 (2010). 
 22. Thomas M. Franck, Fact-Finding in the I.C.J., in FACT-FINDING BEFORE 
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 21, 21–22, 28–29, 31–32 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1992). 
 23. Id. at 28, 32. 
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from the places where the litigated issues arose.24 Unlike domestic 
courts whose judges share common cultural and linguistic ties, 
international judges are, intentionally, a culturally diverse lot.25 This 
means that they are, in addition, at a considerable remove from the 
locus of their cases in ways that go way beyond geography. Even 
assuming that our international adjudicators were willing to undertake 
the active role in fact-finding that Mbengue and other fact-finding 
critics recommend, our international judges are simply less able to spot 
the cultural or other cues that enable local judges to assess factual 
assertions or the credibility of witnesses.26 This is a structural handicap 
that cannot be fixed simply by changing the attitude of international 
judges or making them less afraid of SFF. 
As Combs demonstrates through numerous specific examples, 
international criminal judges are severely handicapped by the 
educational, linguistic, and cultural gaps between judge and witness.27 
These difficulties are one reason why the international community 
moved from primacy to complementarity as the governing jurisdictional 
principle when it moved from the ICTY and the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) to the International Criminal Court 
(ICC).28 The complementarity regime of the ICC accepts that fact-
intensive cases should preferably be adjudicated where the facts 
occurred.29 Apart from practical difficulties, international judges may be 
less inclined to grapple with facts for other reasons. As Richard Bilder 
has suggested, these reasons include:  (1) difficulties in obtaining 
evidence, (2) the fact that international judges are often drawn from 
national appellate courts and have less experience in deciding factual 
issues, (3) the more prestigious character of decisions based on analysis 
of principle rather than fact, and (4) the possibility that international 
judges may believe that an adverse decision will be less offensive to 
states if based on law rather than fact since adverse findings of fact may 
impugn a state’s veracity.30  
 
 24. Id. at 21. 
 25. Id. at 22. 
 26. COMBS, supra note 21, at 4. 
 27. Id. at 63. 
 28. See Bartram S. Brown, Primacy or Complementarily:  Reconciling the Jurisdiction of 
National Courts and International Criminal Tribunals, 23 YALE J. INT’L L. 383, 416 (1998). 
 29. See Mohamed M. El Zeidy, The Principle of Complementarity:  A New Machinery to 
Implement International Criminal Law, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 869, 899 (2001–2002). 
 30. Richard B. Bilder, The Fact/Law Distinction in International Adjudication, in FACT-
FINDING BEFORE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 95, 98 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1992). 
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These reasons help to explain why, back in 1990, Thomas Franck 
critiqued the ICJ’s factual avoidance in cases as distinct as the Temple 
of Preah Vihear, the Nicaragua Case, and the Advisory Opinion in 
Western Sahara.31 Franck demonstrated how, in all three instances, the 
court avoided engaging in difficult fact-finding through strategies of 
evasion such as resorting to procedural or evidentiary rules.32 He 
pointed out how such strategies enabled the court to resolve these 
disputes based purely on a paper trail.33 According to Franck, in each of 
these cases: 
[T]he Court was able to resolve key factual issues without leaving 
The Hague to take testimony, appointing masters, or otherwise 
familiarizing itself with the sights, sounds and smells of the place in 
which the facts were embedded. The need for behaving like a trial 
court was mitigated either by the ossification of the facts, which 
made on-the-spot inquiry unlikely to yield anything beyond the 
existing paper record, which could as well be examined in The 
Hague; or else the Court was spared by the comparative 
unimportance of the facts in the face of some overriding legal 
doctrine that would have produced the same result, whatever facts 
were found by a more diligent search.34 
Franck raised the same issues as Mbengue, even though these 
cases did not raise questions of science. He argued that in a case like 
Nicaragua, where the court was handicapped by the absence of the 
United States during consideration of the merits, the court was ill-served 
by its natural proclivity to say that the outcome would be the same 
regardless of whose version of the facts were true.35 Franck pointed out 
how the failure to engage in genuine fact-finding fosters overly 
expansive law-generation.36 That is, the failure to correct myth number 
one above (and accept the fact that judges generate as well as find the 
law) only exacerbates the prospect that myth number two will also be 
taken as true. He also noted that this failure produces other undesirable 
normative consequences since it favors government litigants that can 
stop their citizens from going to The Hague to testify, and produces 
judicial findings of facts, which, if later proven wrong, undermine the 
credibility of the court itself.37 
 
 31. Franck, supra note 22, at 21. 
 32. Id. at 28. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 29. 
 36. Id. at 31. 
 37. Franck, supra note 22, at 31. 
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All of this raises five queries about Mbengue’s paper and project. 
First, since Franck was not addressing SFF, his point raises questions 
about whether the problems that Mbengue identifies are really about 
cases involving scientific evidence in particular or more generally about 
any kind of case that is heavily fact-based, which probably includes 
most cases that reach the international level. Mbengue needs to tell us 
more about what distinguishes, in his view, scientific evidence and fact-
finding from all other kinds. What exactly is SFF anyway? 
Although Mbengue’s examples draw particularly from cases 
involving health or the environment, many factual determinations 
international tribunals are called upon to make have the characteristics 
he ascribes to scientific evidence or the scientific method. Consider, as 
one example, ICSID awards addressing the level of liability incurred by 
a respondent state for injuries caused to an investor claimant. Many, 
perhaps most, such decisions involving sophisticated investors in 
complex, on-going enterprises require heavily expert-laden assessments 
of fair market or going concern value. Such awards rely on considerable 
familiarity with a particular kind of expertise, namely professional 
accounting standards.38 Is this a form of SFF and if not, why not? 
What about the equally expert-laden evidence presented by 
economists in many of the ICSID cases against Argentina, requiring 
determinations of whether that country’s economic crisis of 2001–2002 
actually threatened fundamental governmental structures and was 
caused by that country’s own actions or those of the IMF?39 These 
factual determinations, like those Mbengue discusses, rely on expert 
knowledge at a considerable remove from that which any layperson, or 
even an arbitrator trained in commercial law, can be presumed to 
possess. Indeed, a recent ICSID annulment award, Enron v. Argentina, 
drew a firm line when distinguishing “economic” from “legal” 
reasoning, and annulled an earlier ruling on the basis that the earlier 
tribunal had used expert evidence by economists to resolve what the 
annulment committee regarded as a legal question.40 
 
 38. See LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Award, 
¶ 101 (July 25, 2007), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH& 
actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC786_En&caseId=C208. 
 39. See José E. Alvarez & Kathryn Khamsi, The Argentine Crisis and Foreign Investors:  A 
Glimpse into the Heart of the Investment Regime, in THE YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW AND POLICY, 2008/09 379, 379–401 (Karl P. Sanvant ed., 2009) (discussing 
ICSID cases against Argentina). 
 40. Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/01/3, Decision on the Application for Annulment of the Argentine Republic, 
¶ 377 (July 30, 2010), http://italaw.com/documents/EnronAnnulmentDecision.pdf. 
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What about expert evidence presented in those cases purporting to 
address whether Argentina’s emergency actions were truly the “only” 
way to address the underlying crisis?41 Such judgments required 
arbitrators to turn themselves into public policy experts in order to 
decide whether alternatives truly existed to address Argentina’s 
underlying crisis. Or consider the testimony of petroleum industry 
experts in other ICSID cases involving Ecuador, in which tribunals have 
been asked to resolve whether high oil prices were indeed foreseeable 
when that country and foreign investors entered into certain contracts 
that failed to anticipate such price hikes.42 On the international criminal 
side, is the historical evidence presented in the ICTR, used to indicate, 
for example, the ways ethnicities were defined in Rwanda,43 also a form 
of SFF? 
All of these cases involved highly complex, factually intensive 
inquiries requiring the application of particular forms of expertise 
outside the ken of the respective adjudicators. In all of these instances, 
the tribunals were asked to make determinations involving probabilities 
and not verifiable certainties.44 Many Argentinian cases involving 
investor-state disputes have involved probabilistic assessments of 
whether, on the whole, that country had made a “substantial 
contribution” to the underlying crisis, for example.45 If all of these cases 
involve SFF, Mbengue’s critique is far more expansive than he appears 
to assume. 
A second question arising out of Mbengue’s paper emerges from 
this last point. Mbengue blames the uncertainty associated with the 
scientific process on international judges’ discomfort with SFF.46 This 
overstates the degree to which SFF is necessarily based on probabilities 
or uncertainties. The value of at least some forms of scientific evidence 
is precisely that they can sometimes tell us that a certain product, for 
example tobacco, does in fact cause cancer when used as directed. Some 
scientific inquiries produce the convincing results that Mbengue claims 
 
 41. CMS Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award, 
¶ 323 (May 12, 2005). 
 42. See generally City of Oriente Limited v. Republic of Ecuador and Empresa Estatal 
Petroleos de Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/21, Decisions on Provisional Measures (Aug. 17, 
2007) (rejecting request for an injunction against Ecuador prohibiting the grant of a contract to 
produce oil from a specific tract of the Ecuadorian Amazon). 
 43. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment (Sept. 2, 1998). 
 44. See generally Alvarez & Khamsi, supra note 39, at 400–01 (noting that ICSID tribunals 
addressing claims arising from Argentine energy utilities found that variables used by the 
claimants had not taken into account effects resulting from economic turmoil). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Mbengue, supra note 2, at 60–61. 
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judges are looking for. Indeed, the scientific method of proof is touted 
precisely on the basis that it can or should lead to a level of certainty 
about cause and effect that is missing from other disciplines such as 
those in the social sciences.47  
In addition to certainty regarding cause and effect, the scientific 
method may yield certainty over time—as even diehard climate change 
deniers may now be learning.48 If Mbengue truly wants to restrict his 
critique to fact-finding based on science, his emphasis on judges’ 
alleged discomfort with conjectural or probabilistic evidence seems 
misplaced since, as the Argentinian cases demonstrate, we may ask our 
international dispute settlers to engage in far more probabilistic 
assessments when undertaking economic or public policy 
determinations than when they have recourse to “science” narrowly 
understood. 
But even if one accepts Mbengue’s point that SFF is frequently 
characterized by or traffics in uncertainty, he needs to provide a great 
deal more evidence to convince readers that judges are all that afraid of 
this aspect of science. Much of Mbengue’s argument rests on the 
proposition that judges are unfamiliar or uneasy with engaging in 
probabilistic forms of analysis.49 Yet, on the contrary, we expect 
judges—domestic and international—to assess probabilities all the time. 
Deciding on the basis of uncertainty is what international and domestic 
courts do every day.50 They are engaged in assessing, for example, 
whether something was more probable than not or, in criminal cases, 
whether the defendant is guilty “beyond a reasonable doubt.”51 Both of 
these standards involve probability assessments. 
Combs’s critique of international criminal courts’ fact-finding ends 
with an in-depth exploration of the probabilistic assessments routinely 
made even under that most rigorous standard for fact-finding among 
courts:  determining whether a defendant is guilty “beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”52 Combs cites considerable evidence showing how even this 
standard is necessarily variable not only in practice but in how it has 
been described by scholars and even by courts (as when they have to 
explain its meaning to juries).53 
 
 47. See id. at 64–65. 
 48. Id. at 62–63. 
 49. Id. at 60–61. 
 50. See COMBS, supra note 21, at 344. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 343–64. 
 53. Id. at 344–45. 
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It turns out that, as applied, “beyond a reasonable doubt” 
encompasses a broad range of probabilities. Judges evaluate the guilt of 
the defendant on the basis of probabilistic factors and not with any 
assurance of certainty.54 They rely on such factors as assessors’ 
tolerance for the possibility of error, including determinations of the 
optimal ratio between wrongful convictions and wrongful acquittals.55 
Combs also points out that, in fact, our probabilistic assessments of 
what it should take to find a defendant guilty varies, including among 
international criminal courts, depending on many subjective factors 
characterized by uncertainty.56 These include the seriousness of the 
charge (e.g., manslaughter versus genocide), the likelihood of 
recidivism (e.g., a child molester versus a genocidaire, who is not likely 
to commit genocide again), the severity of the threatened punishment, 
the punishment that the defendant has already suffered, and the 
defendant’s remorse.57 
Combs speculates that we tolerate a relatively high level of fact-
finding errors among international criminal courts precisely because of 
such assessments.58  In the context of the Rwandan genocide, these 
assessments included weighing the fact that even if the ICTR defendant 
did not commit the specific offense charged, he was likely to have 
committed an equally punishable offense; or assessing the relative value 
of acquittals in high profile cases given the likely effects of such 
acquittals on the fragile enterprise of building viable institutions to 
make war criminals accountable.59 
One can question all of these conclusions, but what seems 
inescapable is that judicial standards of proof involve highly variable 
probability calculations that may change not only from court to court, 
but also from case to case. It is also the case that international judges—
as diverse as those on the European Court of Human Rights and those 
operating under ICSID in the course of investor-state arbitrations—
regularly resort to principles of balancing, or the concept of 
proportionality when weighing the competing interests of property 
 
 54. Id. at 348. 
 55. Id. at 346. Combs indicates that efforts to quantify the reasonable doubt standard have 
traditionally been thought of as requiring a 90 to 95 percent probability of guilt. However, 
American studies of jury verdicts suggest that the level of certainty required for conviction under 
the reasonable doubt standard may be as low as 52.5%. COMBS, supra note 21, at 350. 
 56. See id. at 351. 
 57. Id. at 349–50. 
 58. Id. at 350–51. 
 59. Id. at 353–59. 
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holders and government regulators.60 All of these determinations 
involve assigning weights to uncertain factors or making assessments 
based on probabilities. 
Mbengue needs to tell us more about why judges are comfortable 
with tackling uncertainties head-on in all these contexts, but not with 
respect to SFF. Given judges’ perennial exposure to probabilistic 
assessments we should not assume that, for example, the WTO’s 
rejection of the precautionary principle was due to discomfort with 
attempts to apply probabilities.61 If the WTO Appellate Body cast doubt 
on that principle it was not because of the uncertainties of science; it 
was probably because it was not convinced that the legal principle was 
itself sufficiently recognized as a matter of customary law.62 
A third area needing more scrutiny concerns the significance of 
institutional structure. Mbengue’s contention that international courts 
would do a better job of handling SFF if they were more willing to 
appoint their own experts and go outside the four corners of what the 
litigants present to them presumes that there is one model for an 
international “court,” namely the ICJ model. If, as Mbengue asserts, the 
Methanex tribunal seemed more comfortable with tackling SFF, this 
comfort surely has a lot to do with the fact that the litigants in the case 
elevated the significance of SFF and engaged in extensive presentation 
of witnesses (and their cross-examination) on these issues.63 That 
tribunal would have had to ignore a considerable amount of the 
evidence presented to it—and risk alienating the litigants—if it had 
ignored such questions altogether. At the same time, such arbitral 
tribunals—whose jurisdiction is closely tethered to what the litigants 
submit, and whose rulings may be annulled if they stray from this—
need to be extremely careful about raising facts or law not posed by the 
parties before them. 
While Mbengue suggests that international courts should not be so 
tethered to what litigants present to them, the Methanex case 
demonstrates that the failure to stray from the issues raised by the 
parties may not be the cause of problematic fact-finding, and that 
Mbengue’s proposed solution may not be equally viable for all 
international adjudicators.  Some tribunals may operate on the premise 
 
 60. See Alec Stone Sweet, Investor-State Arbitration:  Proportionality’s New Frontier, 4 L. 
& ETHICS OF HUM. RTS. 47, 59–75 (2010). 
 61. See Mbengue, supra note 2, at 67. 
 62. See Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and 
Shrimp Products, ¶ 130, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998). 
 63. See Mbengue, supra note 2, at 71. 
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that they should address and resolve a dispute solely on the basis of 
what the litigants ask them to address. This self-imposed limitation does 
not necessarily handicap their assessment of facts and may, on the 
contrary, enhance their legitimacy. 
Tribunals that operate on this adversarial model of litigation will 
be both constrained and emboldened in their fact-finding by such 
factors as the likelihood that the tribunal is free to solicit and accept 
amicus briefs or the views of state parties not involved in the litigation 
(as can be the case under the WTO or the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA)).64 Tribunals that elevate the importance of 
settling the concrete dispute before them above other goals are adopting 
the triadic model of adjudication espoused by Martin Shapiro.65 Shapiro 
argues that the principal goal of courts is to render a decision that 
pleases the disputing parties and therefore encourages compliance with 
the judgment of the neutral third party adjudicator.66  
We should not disparage such a limited goal for some forms of 
international adjudication—especially where solving a dispute to the 
satisfaction of the particular litigants helps avoid a potential breach of 
the peace. Settling such disputes one dispute at a time—as opposed to 
establishing judicial precedents pleasing to law professors—may be 
what those particular adjudicators seek to accomplish. This may explain 
why some ICSID arbitrators have signed onto diametrically opposed 
arbitral awards—as in the course of the Argentina cases.67 In such 
instances, it would appear that some arbitrators believe that it is more 
important to the legitimacy of the award and its likelihood of 
enforcement that it be based on consensus, rather than contain a de-
legitimating separate dissent. Who is to say that they are wrong? 
Mbengue downplays the significance of the absence of scientific 
expertise among judges. He argues that the judges can always make up 
for this or for the potential biases of party-appointed experts by 
appointing their own experts.68 But, of course, international courts and 
 
 64. See, e.g., Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes 
art 10, § 2, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401; North American Free Trade Agreement, art. 1804, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 
Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M 289 (1993). 
 65. See MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS:  A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 1–37, 127 
(1981). 
 66. Id. at 3. 
 67. Compare CMS Transmission Co., supra note 41, ¶¶ 1–6 with LG&E Enegy Corp. v. 
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, ¶ 267(a)–(f) (Oct. 3, 
2006), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=GenCaseDtlsRH&actionVal= 
ListPending (both involving the participation of arbitrator Judge Francisco Rezek). 
 68. Mbengue, supra note 2, at 75–76. 
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tribunals usually operate under fiscal or other constraints, which affect 
what they can realistically do, including with respect to fact-finding.69 
Other structural issues—such as whether the particular international 
court exists within an institution that permits appellate review, insists on 
transparency, or provides its adjudicators with other institutional 
support (as is true of WTO panels, which rely on the WTO’s 
considerable legal secretariat)70—also influence a court’s aptitude 
towards engaging in detailed fact-finding.  
Fiscal or operational constraints do not, however, always point 
against the active participation of judges in building a case, including 
with respect to facts. Counterexamples on this point may be the ICTY 
and ICTR. There is evidence that the completion strategy for those 
tribunals, demanding that they end all pending trials by a certain date, 
has inspired a more proactive judiciary with respect to fact-finding.71 As 
Maximo Langer has pointed out, the pressure to quicken the pace of 
trials has encouraged a “managerial” approach to judging within those 
tribunals more akin to that found in some U.S. courts.72 How courts 
handle scientific or other facts requires consideration of the differing 
roles envisioned for different international courts, as is reflected in their 
differing structures, rules, and jurisdictional limitations.  
The relative embeddedness of a court within a larger regime also 
matters. Whether a court’s assessment of the facts (or the law) is likely 
to remain the last word within the specific legal regime in which it 
operates is likely to influence how (or even whether) it engages in fact-
finding.  
To the extent a court exists within a broader institutional 
framework that permits state parties to exercise their exit and voice, this 
too will influence just how “proactive” on either law-making or fact-
finding a judge or arbitrator is likely to be. Investor-state arbitral 
tribunals—which operate within a regime that permits states displeased 
with an arbitral outcome to resort to annulment proceedings, exercise 
civil disobedience by failing to pay arbitral awards, exit from the 
underlying treaty regimes (such as ICSID or a particular Bilateral 
 
 69. See Stefan Trechsel, A World Court for Human Rights, 1 NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 3, 
¶ 47 (2003). 
 70. See Overview of the WTO Secretariat, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/secre_e/intro_e.htm (last visited Apr. 23, 2012). 
 71. See generally Completion Strategy, UN ICTY, http://www.icty.org/sid/10016 (last 
visited Apr. 23, 2012). 
 72. Maximo Langer, Managerial Judging Goes International, But Its Promise Remains 
Unfulfilled:  An Empirical Assessment of the ICTY Reforms, 36 YALE J. INT’L L. 241, 242, 289 
(2011). 
  
2011] International Judges Afraid of Science? 93 
Investment Treaty), or issue “interpretations” of the same treaties that 
the arbitrators are interpreting—may be more inclined to engage in 
active fact-finding than other tribunals.73  
As is true with respect to a court’s ability to declare the law, a 
court’s ability to assert itself with respect to the facts—and especially to 
present sua sponte factual issues that the litigants ignore—may turn on 
whether the court thinks it can get away with such determinations, or 
whether it needs to pay heed to its own fragile legitimacy or 
jurisdiction. This is not simply a matter of determining whether an 
international court exists within a structure of appellate review. The 
WTO Appellate Body can only review findings of law, not fact, and it is 
not capable of remanding to a WTO panel to revisit factual findings.74 
An ICSID annulment process is even more restricted, at least on paper, 
and is not supposed to undertake even a full-scale review of legal 
findings.75 In both instances, despite some forms of appellate “review,” 
original fact-finding determinations may prove difficult to overturn.  
For its part, the ICC operates within a hierarchical system that 
permits appeals from a trial chamber or pre-trial chamber;76 it also 
operates within a system that includes an Assembly of State Parties that 
at present seems inclined to “supervise” even the actions of the 
“independent” prosecutor to some extent.77 We should not expect all our 
international tribunals, despite differences in structure or goals, to 
approach fact-finding the same way. The structure of our courts, as well 
as the rules under which they operate, matter.78 
A fourth point is simply a reminder that, as students of evidentiary 
standards have pointed out for a long time, international judges’ 
approaches to fact-finding may depend at least to some extent on their 
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own backgrounds.79 Although the difference between Anglo-Saxon and 
civil law judges have been overstated, it still remains the case that, as 
Durward Sandifer indicated long ago, judges from the Anglo-American 
tradition may approach the process of judging less as a search for 
absolute “truth” than as a process that rewards the litigant who succeeds 
in presenting the most convincing evidence.80 His or her approach may 
be quite different from someone trained in Germany where the judge is 
active even in the formulation of the issues on the basis of statements of 
fact submitted by the parties.81 As Sandifer notes, despite the absence of 
technical rules restricting the admission of evidence within most 
international tribunals, members of such tribunals are inclined to weigh 
the evidence that is submitted to them in ways that are familiar to judges 
from their home state.82  Moreover, international courts comprised of 
judges from both the civil and common law, such as the ad hoc war 
crimes tribunals,83 have forged some awkward compromises that reflect 
these competing traditions—and perhaps some of the processes that 
Mbengue criticizes are the product of such compromises.84  
Finally, it is important to consider what effect is produced by a 
judgment that, as Mbengue would recommend, would directly tackle 
(and purport to answer) questions such as whether the gasoline additive 
methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE) does or does not cause cancer. Even 
the Methanex case that Mbengue praises did not attempt to answer that 
scientific question, despite its central importance to that litigation.85 The 
Methanex arbitrators found instead that the challenged California ban on 
MTBE was motivated by a reasonable belief that MTBE had adverse 
health effects, that mitigating that perceived risk by cleaning up 
contaminated groundwater instead of banning the chemical to begin 
with was too difficult and expensive, and that the policy decision that 
California made was not undertaken to favor domestic ethanol 
producers.86 
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While the Methanex case dealt extensively with the scientific 
evidence on point, it deployed that evidence to address a non-scientific, 
legal question:  namely whether the challenged government policy 
violated NAFTA by being discriminatory.87 Even the Methanex 
arbitrators seemed to accept the proposition that an ICSID tribunal is 
not engaged in the same exercise as scientists who study the effects of 
MTBE on the human body.88 MTBE’s effects on health can be uncertain 
and based on probabilities—as is the different determination of whether 
the authorities in California were in all likelihood more motivated by 
those studies than by the political pleas of its ethanol producers. Both 
are probabilistic assessments grounded in uncertainty but they are not 
the same assessment.  
Mbengue would not characterize what the Methanex tribunal did in 
that instance as a strategy of avoidance, but it is important to see that 
what that tribunal did was not in substance all that different from what 
the ICJ did in the cases that Franck criticizes.89 In all these instances, the 
respective tribunals avoided answering the “scientific” or factual 
question and answered a legal one instead. The difference among these 
tribunals’ handling of the facts (or SFF) is a matter of degree. 
Contrary to what Mbengue suggests, the decision in Methanex 
suggests the virtue of avoiding a direct confrontation with a scientific 
question. Had the Methanex tribunal directly found that MTBE causes 
cancer in humans, that finding would have been subject to 
delegitimation over time if subsequent scientific studies proved or 
suggested the contrary. Reliance on such a scientific finding would have 
exposed the Methanex ruling—and even ICSID arbitration itself—to an 
unnecessary risk. That risk is not as apparent with respect to the 
determination actually rendered in that case. Even if MTBE is proven 
not to be health risk, that outcome is not relevant to whether the U.S. 
government acted reasonably and prudently in that case given the state 
of existing scientific knowledge at that time.  
The risk to the future legitimacy of the Methanex ruling by  
unknown technological developments suggests that there is some 
wisdom in keeping SFF, as such, within the domain of those capable of 
doing it, and letting lawyers and judges make passive use of what they 
find for their own purposes. If this is true, international judges ought to 
be a little afraid of tackling the underlying scientific questions—or at 
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least not be overly confident that they can provide a scientific answer 
that even some scientists might want to avoid. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Mbengue gives an affirmative answer to the question posed by the 
title to this essay, “Are International Judges Afraid of Science?”90 When 
his critique of SFF is put in the context of older critiques of fact-finding 
by international courts and tribunals, five questions emerge:  (1) are the 
problems that Mbengue describes unique to “scientific” evidence?; (2) 
is judicial discomfort with scientific evidence really due to unease with 
scientific uncertainty?; (3) how do the procedural rules governing a 
particular international court influence judges’ treatment of scientific 
fact?; (4) does the cultural or other background of the judges matter?; 
and (5) do we really want judges to give direct answers to scientific 
questions?  
Mbengue’s paper does not fully address these questions. As a 
result, the essay’s response to the question posed by the title of this 
essay is more categorical than it otherwise might be. Although 
international judges face difficult problems when it comes to fact-
finding, it is not entirely clear that the alleged uncertainties associated 
with science or scientific evidence have much to do with those 
difficulties. Further, to the extent that judges avoid direct responses to 
scientific questions, this avoidance may be, at least in certain cases, not 
such a bad thing. To the extent that international judges are “afraid” of 
science, this fear may reflect a wise acceptance of their limitations as 
legal professionals and a smart concession to the limited contributions 
that courts can make to “scientific” questions. 
Mbengue is one in a long line of eminent critics of international 
adjudicative fact-finding.91 It is all too easy to agree that international 
judges do not handle facts as well as they could. Indeed, some of the 
criticisms of international judicial fact-finding are so fundamental that 
Mbengue’s confidence that international judges, when properly advised, 
can handle any type of fact before them, may be overly optimistic. 
Given the structural and other impediments that international judges 
face, accurate fact-finding, whether involving the application of science 
or not, may be a step too far for international courts, at least as these are 
presently constituted. But Mbengue’s paper is not entirely convincing to 
the extent that it claims that international judges are doing an especially 
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poor job with respect to handling “scientific” facts or that what is 
required of judges when it comes to SFF is all that distinguishable from 
all other tasks that we ask them to do.92 
None of this is intended to suggest that international judges’ 
handling of science or more generally expert-driven evidence does not 
merit special scrutiny. SFF raises many serious questions that are not 
addressed by Mbengue’s article. Perhaps we should worry about more 
than just whether judges are afraid of science. We ought to be equally 
concerned with whether judges are, in some cases, overly deferential 
and only too ready to accept some forms of expert-driven “fact.”  
Critics of how international judges handle science should consider 
the broader questions that David Kennedy, among others, have raised 
about the role of experts in international law.93 For example, does 
judicial resort or deference to seemingly neutral scientific “expertise” 
deflect attention from value-laden judgments that ought to be addressed 
more directly and challenged on normative grounds? The WTO’s 
reliance, through its Agreement on Technical Barrier to Trade on 
international standards set by the Codex Commission is one prominent 
example.94  Through decisions like EC–Sardines, the WTO has set the 
burden of proof for parties relying on the Codex so low that it 
effectively puts the burden of production on the state that wants to 
deviate from the international standard.95  
Such decisions—which rely on a form of “scientific” expertise 
without exploring whether this is truly warranted—silently constrain the 
regulatory autonomy of governments. Decisions that rely on scientific 
expertise may undervalue the virtues of regulatory diversity and 
democratic experimentation among nations or local communities within 
a nation. As Kennedy suggests, reliance on international standards set 
by experts has normative implications that are generally left unexplored 
by the judges who rely on them.96  
Enforcement of “scientific” or other standards set by epistemic 
communities through international courts may subtly benefit wealthy 
Northern states, or certain non-governmental organizations, or men over 
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women. Such questions are usually not addressed by international 
judges. Perhaps Mbengue would argue that they are afraid to consider 
them. The decision in EC–Sardines does not indicate who benefits and 
who loses from reliance on scientific and other forms of expertise. If 
Mbengue’s prescriptions encouraging judges to re-open the appreciation 
of scientific evidence will result in greater attention to such questions, 
this result may be a good reason to pursue them. 
